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Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is an 
experiment…we want it to succeed, but if it 
fails, it is still a valuable experience 
— Deng Xiaoping, June 29, 1985
Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability is 
closely associated with China’s development 
strategy 
— Deng Xiaoping, June 3, 1988
Introduction
Shenzhen used to be a tiny town of around 
30,000 people, north of the then prosperous 
British colony, Hong Kong, in southern China. 
The story is certainly entirely different now 
that Shenzhen is comparable to, if it has not 
already outshone its once proud neighbor. 
Shenzhen’s Nanshan district, home to a 
huge hi-tech industrial park, is now China’s 
richest, with a higher per capita GDP than 
even capitalist Hong Kong. This article will 
compare the two cities through the use of 
CIV city cases. It will discuss whether the 
institutional differences can help to explain 
the respective growth stories of the cities. 
Afterwards, the article will consider the 
prospects of the Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong 
Kong Modern Service Industry Cooperation 
Zone, a national-level initiative to combine 
the core strengths of the two cities in an 
attempt to boost the existing technology 
center to a new level before a conclusion is 
drawn.
1. Institutional Differences Between 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong
Institutions are important for economic 
growth. The development of Hong Kong’s 
institutions has a close connection with its 
historical status as a colony of the British 
Empire, even after the handover. Having 
a legal system inherited from England is 
widely regarded as one of Hong Kong’s 
advantages. 
The development of company law, which 
can facilitate the conduct of business, is a 
good example. Company law is important 
in two ways. First, it governs the corporate 
form which provides attractive features 
such as limited liability to shield the 
personal liability of investors, as well as the 
transferability of shares to give investors 
an exit right. Second, the law provides a 
clear allocation of rights and control to 
shareholders so that they are able to protect 
themselves by, for example, using their 
decision rights. 
Hong Kong is a clear winner in this regard. 
The genesis of the current framework was 
the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance of 1865 
which mirrored the English Companies Act 
of 1862. It has closely followed the English 
model since then. In sharp contrast, China 
did not have a proper set of company laws 
until 1993. Unfortunately, the first company 
law was primarily aimed at state-owned 
enterprises but not private economic 
activities. 
The law was generally highly restrictive; 
for example, it required all share transfers 
to take place through a securities exchange, 
which meant that a private non-market 
transfer between parties was not possible. 
Also, the law prohibited the directors of a 
company from transferring their own shares 
during their term of office, which effectively 
discouraged senior management of a 
company from having a financial interest 
in the company. The law was then amended 
several times to foster a more functional and 
friendly regime; for example, in 2013, the law 
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was revamped to streamline the registration 
formalities and relax the threshold for 
setting up a company. 
In light of the recent legal reforms, it might 
be useful to refer to the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Report 2016, which provides 
measures of business regulations for local 
companies in 189 economies, to see how 
China has fared against Hong Kong (see 
table below). It can be seen that Hong Kong’s 
regime remains better than that of China 
in all but one important aspect of doing 
business.
Despite the fact that Hong Kong is still 
leading in a number of aspects, it is unfair 
to write off China’s efforts in improving its 
institutional environment through various 
legal reforms. Poor investor protection may 
put off potential funders from investing in a 
venture. In this regard, positive changes in 
the regulatory framework were witnessed in 
the revisions to the Chinese Company Law in 
2005; for example, companies are allowed to 
use cumulative voting, thereby empowering 
minority shareholders to appoint their 
representatives to the corporate boards. 
Also, a stricter duty of care is imposed 
on directors, supervisors, and senior 
management. 
In the case of a dispute, shareholders have 
express rights to bring a legal action against 
corporate officers. Academic study has 
confirmed the significant upward movement 
in the level of shareholder protection made 
by China between 1995 and 2005. It is worth 
noting that law reforms may not necessarily 
lead to a better outcome (at least in the 
context of this article). One notable example 
will be the introduction of Labor Contract 
Law in 2008. 
Following legal moves to enhance labor 
rights, the rising cost of China’s famously 
cheap labor, the very factor that the country’s 
economic boom was built on, appears 
to be irreversible. Such a change, which 
should have been welcomed by workers, 
means soaring business costs. The effect 
was immediate. In the first 10 months of 
2008, 15,661 enterprises in Guangdong, the 
province where Shenzhen is located, closed 
their doors. Foxconn, Apple’s supplier, which 
operates a mega-sized production base with 
500,000 employees in Shenzhen, is now in the 
process of moving some production to India. 
Indeed, spiraling business and living costs 
are the common problem facing the two 
cities. Hong Kong has been ranked globally 
as the least affordable city in which to buy 
a home, with average apartment prices at 
19 times gross annual median income, the 
highest ever measured in the U.S.-based 
Demographia’s survey in the past 11 years. 
Likewise, in April 2016 homes in Shenzhen 
were sold at an average of RMB 49,259 per 
square meter (or US$690 a square foot), as 
much as the Rockridge neighborhood in 
Oakland in the U.S., a pricey part of the San 
Francisco Bay Area, where home prices 
average US$704 a square foot. The lack of 
affordable housing is causing talent and 
companies to leave or consider leaving 
for more affordable cities. Ren Zhenfei, 
founder of Huawei, warned that Shenzhen’s 
housing prices could destroy the city’s 
competitiveness.
2. Rise of the Once Humble Neighbor 
In spite of a seemingly inferior institutional 
environment, it has not inhibited the rise 
of tech giants such as Huawei and Tencent, 
whose headquarters are in Shenzhen.
Founded by Ren Zhengfei in 1987, Huawei 
has grown from a small company with a 
turnover of just US$5,680 to a global company 
with a turnover of more than US$39 billion 
with a business presence in more than 170 
countries and a staff of 170,000 in 2014. 
Huawei is a private business, wholly owned 
by its employees, with 82,471 employees 
owning shares in the company. According 
to the International Data Corporation, 
Huawei was the third-largest mobile phone 
manufacturer in the world in 2016, with 
9.3 percent of market share, just behind 
Samsung (22.8%) and Apple (11.7%). 
In the case of Tencent, it was founded in 
1998 by Ma Huateng and others with the 
backing of Naspers, a South Africa-based 
multinational Internet and media group. In 
2004, Tencent went public on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. The company is a leading 
provider of Internet value-added services 
in China, and its headquarters is in the 
Nanshan District of Shenzhen. According 
to Barron’s, in September 2016 Tencent 
became Asia’s largest company by market 
capitalization. 
Despite its success in attracting Tencent to 
list on its stock exchange, Hong Kong has 
still had a number of missed opportunities. 
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange introduced 
the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in 
November 1999 to provide fund-raising 
opportunities for growth companies. 
Companies’ abilities to obtain credit are a 
fundamental factor as to whether they can 
continue to grow. 
Table 1: How Hong Kong and China Have Fared 
Respectively in Different Key Aspects of Doing 
Business.      
Source: World Bank (2016), Doing Business Report 
World Bank’s Doing Business Ranking of 
189 Economies
Topics China’s Ranking
Hong 
Kong’s 
Ranking
Starting a Business 136 4
Dealing with 
Construction Permits 176 7
Getting Electricity 92 9
Registering Property 43 59
Obtaining Credit 79 19
Protecting Minority 
Investors 134 1
Paying Taxes 132 4
Trading across Borders 96 47
Enforcing Contracts 7 22
Resolving Insolvency 55 26
Accessing credit has been a significant 
obstacle for Chinese companies. For 
example, at the end of 2006, according to 
the World Bank (2008), smaller businesses 
which contributed some 60% of China’s 
GDP, accounted for only 15% of outstanding 
credit, most of which came from banks. This 
demonstrates the urgent need to diversify the 
fund-raising channels for these companies. 
Hong Kong’s GEM should have been well 
placed to capture Chinese businesses. China 
finally launched its own Growth Enterprise 
Board (GEB) in October 2009, almost 10 years 
later than Hong Kong, and quickly outshone 
its Hong Kong counterpart. 
As of now, Shenzhen’s GEB has 555 
companies, with a total market capitalization 
of RMB 5,636 billion (US$818 billion), 
compared to Hong Kong’s GEM which has 
248 companies, with a combined market 
capitalization of HKD 289 billion (US$37 
billion). 
A further missed opportunity is DJI, a market 
leader in unmanned aerial systems. The 
founder of the company is Frank Wang, 
who developed an unmanned miniature 
helicopter during his studies at the Hong 
Kong University of Science and Technology. 
This academic project paved the way for his 
highly successful business. DJI was estimated 
to account for 70% of the drone market in 
2015. It is fair to say that DJI indeed has 
roots in Hong Kong despite the fact that the 
company was founded in 2006 in Shenzhen 
and then succeeded there.
In the face of some early successes for 
tech start-ups in Shenzhen, the Hong Kong 
government started to introduce various 
policy initiatives to promote technology and 
innovation. This was in sharp contrast to the 
non-interventionist philosophy shown by 
the colonial government, as discussed in the 
city’s case box in this article. 
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A major step was taken in 1999 when the 
government decided to proceed with the 
development of a Cyberport on the western 
side of Hong Kong Island. It was envisaged 
that upon full development, the Cyberport 
would accommodate about 130 companies of 
different sizes specializing in the application 
of advanced information technology. 
Simultaneously, a science park was 
established in Tai Po in the New Territories, 
with a view to further enhancing Hong 
Kong’s technological infrastructure. 
In a 1999 policy address, then chief executive, 
Tung Chee-hwa, also foreshadowed other 
initiatives such as the establishment of a 
HKD 5 billion innovation and technology 
fund, the Applied Science and Technology 
Research Institute, and a growth enterprise 
market on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
After more than a decade of operation, 
former legislator Sin Chung-kai, who had 
represented the IT sector, reviewed the 
contribution of the Cyberport and the science 
park, remarking that “Both projects weren’t 
failures, but I wouldn’t say they were huge 
successes”. 
On the one hand, the Cyberport was able to 
nurture home-grown start-ups including 
GoGoVan, which links freelance truck 
drivers with people who need goods 
delivered, Coachbase, a developer of digital 
tools for sports teams, and AfterShip, which 
operates a global package tracking system 
for online retailers. On the other hand, it 
is worth noting that Hong Kong’s economy 
has not been able to diversify with the 
introduction of various initiatives. Indeed, 
the city has become even more reliant on 
the four major sectors of financial services 
– trade services, professional services, and 
tourism.
3. Potential Synergy of the Two Cities
As discussed in  Shenzhen’s city case box in 
this issue, nowadays the city largely owes 
its success to its Special Economic Zone 
status and as a symbol of the pioneer in the 
country’s economic reform. The central 
government clearly wants to take the city to 
the next level by drawing on the institutional 
advantages of nearby Hong Kong. 
The Qianhai Shenzhen–Hong Kong Modern 
Service Industry Cooperation Zone 
(hereafter “Qianhai”), covering an area 
of 15 square kilometers, is located in the 
western part of Shenzhen. The concept 
was first initiated in August 2010 when the 
Overall Development Plan for Qianhai was 
released. The State Council affirmed the plan 
by announcing 22 measures which cover 
seven main aspects, including finance, tax, 
law, talents, education, medical care, and 
telecommunications, for the development 
and opening up of Qianhai. 
The development strategy is twofold. First, 
preferential policies are granted. Second, the 
state’s intention is to take advantage of the 
more developed institutions in Hong Kong 
by forming a collaborative relationship. 
According to the Trade Development Council 
of Hong Kong (2015), the vision of Qianhai 
is to develop the zone into a hi-tech hub like 
Silicon Valley by attracting and developing 
the presence of venture capital, angel 
investors, hedge funds, and private equity, 
using Hong Kong’s experience in finance to 
support the further growth of the innovative 
and technology sector.
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Comparative Law Review, 
38(2): 191–224.
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Company and Commercial 
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Conclusion
Institutions alone apparently cannot account 
for Shenzhen’s rise. Hong Kong is superior to 
Shenzhen in terms of the ease to do business. 
Yet, the technology sector has thrived in 
Shenzhen but not in Hong Kong. One possible 
explanation is that talents are not mobile 
between Shenzhen and Hong Kong owing 
to border control. Shenzhen can easily 
draw on talent in a country of 1.3 billion 
people, but Hong Kong cannot. Shenzhen has 
arguably been one of the best destinations 
for budding entrepreneurs in China because 
Shenzhen is the most “special” among the 
Special Economic Zones, and Qianhai will 
be “more special than a Special Economic 
Zone”. Qianhai seems to be a test of the 
mutually beneficial idea that one city has 
the innovation while another city has the 
capability to take it further.
48    Coller Venture Review  #5 (2017) — City Venture Issue
   
Coller Venture Review  #5 (2017) — City Venture Issue    49 
HONG KONG, 1997–2016 
A LACKLUSTER PEARL OF THE ORIENT
Professor Flora Huang 
University of Essex
Professor Horace Yeung 
University of Leicester
Inhabitants: 5 million (1979); 6.5 million 
(1997); 7.3 million (2015)
The Geographical Context
Hong Kong is located at the mouth of the 
Pearl River Delta on the coast of southern 
China, immediately south of Shenzhen. The 
boundary of Hong Kong has been largely 
unchanged since it was annexed by the 
British Empire during the Imperial China 
era. Addition of land has been achieved 
through reclamation.
Relationship with Government
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong became a Special 
Administrative Region of China. Under the 
Basic Law of Hong Kong, the city enjoys 
a high degree of autonomy in accordance 
with the principle of “One Country Two 
Systems.” It possesses independent executive, 
legislative and judicial powers, but matters 
such as foreign affairs and national defense 
remain the responsibility of the Chinese 
central government.
Hong Kong’s legal system remains based on 
English common law. According to the Basic 
Law of Hong Kong, the socialist system and 
policies in China are not practiced in Hong 
Kong, and the city’s capitalist system and 
way of life are to remain unchanged until 
2047. The Law also stipulates that the laws 
previously in force in Hong Kong, including 
common law, rules of equity, ordinances, 
subordinate legislation, and customary law 
are maintained.
Anchor Institutions
• Financial markets with a long history. 
Trading in company shares can be traced 
back to about 1860. One of the largest 
banks in the world, HSBC, first opened its 
door for business in Hong Kong in 1865.
• Reliable government system. The World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators 2015 
placed Hong Kong in the top 10 percent 
in terms of rule of law amongst 215 
countries. Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index 2015 placed 
Hong Kong 18th out of 168 countries. 
• A free port. No tariff is charged on import 
or export of goods. Further, Hong Kong’s 
capital account is fully convertible, and 
there are no restrictions on foreign 
exchange dealings. 
Venture Statistics
• GDP per capita in the city rose from HKD 
22,860 in 1979 to HKD 211,592 in 1997 and 
HKD 328,117 in 2015 (The HKD has been 
pegged at a rate of around 7.8 per 1 USD 
since 1983).
• There were 474,517 companies in 1997; in 
2015, the number rose to 1,288,666.
• Hong Kong is predominantly a service 
economy. This sector generated 92.7% of 
GDP in 2014, rising from 67.5% in 1980 
and 84.4% in 1996. 
• The number of patents granted rose from 
2,619 in 1999 to 6,458 in 2015.
Strengths
• Role as regional center. Hong Kong 
is regarded as a premier commercial 
and financial center in the region; it is 
ranked first in the World Competitiveness 
Ranking 2016 and third in the Global 
Financial Centers Index of 2015. 
• The legal system. Maintaining a legal 
system inherited from England is 
widely regarded as one of Hong Kong’s 
advantages. 
• Capitalist focus. Another possible 
explanation for Hong Kong’s success 
was its determination to promote 
capitalism under colonial rule. Milton 
Friedman once referred to Hong Kong as 
the example of capitalism in action, as 
symbolized by its laissez-faire economic 
policy. Hong Kong has always tried to 
foster a flexible and competitive private 
sector, and to retain a small government 
posture.
• The China factor. Owing to the city’s geo-
political proximity with China, the city’s 
economy has taken advantage of the rise 
of the Chinese economy by performing 
roles such as financier, trading partner, 
middleman, and facilitator.
Weaknesses
• China’s interventionist policy. It is 
believed that Hong Kong’s competitive 
advantages have been slowly eroded 
under Chinese rule, which has elicited 
the following media commentaries: 
“The Death of Hong Kong”; “Is Hong 
Kong Dying?”; and “An Era in Hong 
Kong is Ending, Thanks to China’s Tight 
Embrace.” One observation is that the 
government has been becoming more 
interventionist since the handover, as 
opposed to its previous positive non-
interventionist approach. For example, 
during the Asian financial crisis in 1998, 
Donald Tsang, then chief executive, led an 
unusual plan to buy 11% of the shares on 
the Hang Seng Index, paying for the move 
by drawing on foreign exchange reserves. 
• Political tensions. The tension between 
pro-Beijing and pro-democracy groups 
in the city has increased, as exemplified 
by the Umbrella Revolution and a related 
Occupy Central movement in 2014. 
• Uncertainty in the future. Political 
stability is obviously a concern to 
investors. Confidence in the city has 
not been helped by the uncertainty left 
behind by the fact that Hong Kong’s 
special status will only last until 2047.
Ecosystem Players
As mentioned, the “positive non-
interventionism” philosophy of the Hong 
Kong government means that it has not 
tried very hard to develop the technological 
sector. However, with the formation of 
the Innovation and Technology Bureau in 
November 2015 this is changing. The bureau 
is responsible for policy matters with a 
view to transforming Hong Kong into an 
innovation hub for technology.
Strategies Employed
Milton Friedman regarded Hong Kong as the 
best example of a free market economy and 
famously said, “If you want to see capitalism 
in action, go to Hong Kong. ” 
Furthermore, family-controlled companies, 
which are common in Hong Kong, can 
make efficient decisions owing to a more 
personalized method of control, with less 
paperwork and fewer formalities. There is 
often family dominance in management 
largely based on personal trust. Frequent 
family contact limits discussions and 
negotiations in the organizational setting. 
This contact facilitates the tacit use of 
processes through the introduction of norms 
created by the family.
Results
Hong Kong remains an important center 
for trade, finance, and business in Asia, 
strategically located at the doorstep of 
China’s huge and vibrant economy. However, 
its importance has been overshadowed by 
the rise of other Chinese cities, most notably 
Shenzhen and Shanghai in terms of the 
technology and financial sectors respectively.
Lessons and Conclusions
• Hong Kong has always had a versatile 
economy. Before the growth and 
dominance of its financial services sector, 
international trade had long been a 
defining characteristic of the Hong Kong 
economy. Beginning in the 1950s, exports 
of domestically produced light industrial 
products served as the engine of growth 
for nearly three decades. Nonetheless, 
since the late 1970s, the migration of 
factories to Mainland China has forced 
Hong Kong to transform into a service-
oriented economy.
• The “One Country, Two Systems” 
principle, as laid down in the Hong 
Kong Basic Law, has enabled the city to 
maintain its institutional advantages 
after the handover. However, the 
city’s future will largely hinge on how 
credible the Chinese state is in keeping 
its promises. The increasing discontent 
amongst citizens about the local political 
environment and the resulting civil 
unrest undoubtedly cast doubt over the 
city’s future. 
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SHENZHEN, 1979–2016 
FROM LOW-TECH TO HI-TECH
Professor Flora Huang 
University of Essex
Professor Horace Yeung 
University of Leicester
Inhabitants 30,000 (1979); 10 million (2016)
The Geographical Context
Shenzhen is a major city in Guangdong 
Province of southern China, located 
immediately north of Hong Kong. Its 
proximity to Hong Kong can explain the city’s 
early rise which was highly successfully in 
attracting investments from Hong Kong. 
Relationship with Government
The city was designated as one of the first 
four Special Economic Zones in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. These zones were 
established to encourage foreign citizens 
and overseas Chinese and their companies – 
especially those from Hong Kong and Macau 
– to open factories and set up enterprises 
and other establishments there. Preferential 
treatment was given to these investors. 
Anchor Institutions
Shenzhen’s Hi-Tech Park located in the 
Nanshan District has been home to tech 
giants such as Tencent (established in 
1998), ZTE (established in 1985), and DJI 
(established in 2006).
Venture Statistics
• GDP per capita in the city rose from RMB 
606 (around US$260) in 1979 to RMB 
160,000 (around US$25,500) in 2015.
• There were only 501 enterprises in 1979; 
by 2014, the number had risen to 843,977.
• Secondary industries contributed only 
20.5 percent of GDP in 1979, but rose 
to 50% in the 2000s, while tertiary 
industries contributed to another half of 
GDP. Here secondary industries refer to 
mining, manufacturing, production and 
supply of electric power, water and gas, 
and construction. Tertiary industries 
refer to all other industries not included 
in primary (mostly agricultural) or 
secondary industries.
• Number of patents granted rose from 160 in 
1991 to 53,687 in 2014.
Strengths
• Excellent support from the central 
government. As part of China’s national 
economic reform in 1978, Shenzhen’s 
Special Economic Zone status had enabled 
it to gain a first mover advantage over 
other cities which were opened to overseas 
investment at a later time. In addition 
to being granted Special Economic Zone 
status, Shenzhen has enjoyed symbolic 
status as the pioneer in the country’s 
economic reform and was famously visited 
by the legendary Chinese leader, Deng 
Xiaoping, as part of his Southern Excursion 
in 1992. 
• Foreign investment incentives. The Special 
Economic Zone status provides foreigners 
with actual incentives to set up a business 
there. These include, for example, the 
preferential rate of income tax of 15%, 
notably lower than the rate of 20–40% 
outside the zone. Furthermore, raw and 
semi-processed materials, machinery 
and equipment, and other capital goods 
necessary for production that are imported 
by enterprises in the zone are exempt 
from import duties. Also, the lawful profit 
that an investor receives can be remitted 
abroad, despite the existence of currency 
control in China.
Weaknesses
• Inherent weaknesses of the Chinese 
economy. The city’s development may 
have been hampered by some of China’s 
weaknesses as a developing country. 
Corruption is still perceived as widespread 
in China, having been ranked 83rd out of 168 
countries by Transparency International 
in its Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. 
President Xi Jinping’s high profile anti-
corruption campaign seeks to address this 
problem, but much remains to be done.
• Weak rule of law. Despite repeated 
attempts to encourage the government 
to update its laws – for example, the 
revision to the Chinese company law 
in 2005 and 2013 respectively – the 
country’s rule of law is still perceived as 
weak, as exemplified by the World Bank 
Governance Indicators 2015 placing the 
country on the 44th percentile in this 
regard. 
• Weak intellectual property rights 
protection. As indicated by the U.S. 
embassy in Beijing, despite stronger 
statutory protection following China’s 
WTO accession, China “continues to be 
a haven for counterfeiters and pirates”. 
Lax legal protection is not necessarily a 
disadvantage; for example, several tech 
giants in China have allegedly imitated 
their Western counterparts. Tencent’s QQ 
messenger is believed to be an imitation 
of the Israeli service ICQ and Xiaomi is 
hailed as the “Apple of the East”. 
• Adverse effects of enhanced labor 
protection. After the introduction of 
the Labor Contract Law in 2007, the 
resulting rising cost of China’s famously 
cheap labor immediately dented the 
labor intensive manufacturing sector in 
Guangdong Province. 
Ecosystem Players
Since 2011, the Shenzhen Science and 
Technology Innovation Commission has 
played an influential role in strengthening 
the city’s positions as a key zone for 
innovation and technology in China. One 
notable effort is the “peacock plan,” an 
incentive plan to lure overseas talents to 
bring their advanced ideas, techniques, and 
business to Shenzhen. From 2011–2015, 61 
“peacock” teams were attracted to the city, 
benefiting successful hi-tech enterprises such 
as DJI.
Strategies Employed 
Deng Xiaoping’s vision of development was 
that some people and regions should get rich 
first so that they can provide “demonstration 
effects” for the rest of the country. This was 
evidenced by the Chinese government’s 
determination to nurture Shenzhen and 
some other coastal cities such as Shanghai.
Shenzhen’s Special Economic Zone status 
is one example of the central government’s 
support to develop the city. Furthermore, 
the National Medium to Long-term Plan for 
Scientific and Technological Development 
(2006–2020) showed the central government’s 
determination to strengthen the technology 
sector. The city’s Twelfth Five-Year Economic 
Plan was accordingly tailored around the 
national goal to set out the necessary actions.
Results 
The establishment of Special Economic 
Zones was meant to attract global foreign 
investment, but the reality was investors 
almost solely came from Hong Kong. 
Since the late 1970s, many Hong Kong 
manufacturers have relocated their labor-
intensive production processes to China. 
Owing to the influx of capital and skills from 
Hong Kong, Shenzhen’s economy has been 
well developed relative to the rest of China, 
and therefore has been able to attract talent 
from all over China. 
Shenzhen’s Nanshang district is home to 
8,000 hi-tech companies. The district’s 
per capita GDP reached RMB 308,700 in 
2014, overtaking its neighbor Hong Kong, 
approaching the standard of Singapore, and 
ranking first among China’s counties and 
districts. The city is the cradle of tech giants 
such as Tencent, Huawei, and ZTE.
Lessons and Conclusions
• Shenzhen has successfully evolved from 
a production base of light industrial 
products to a high value-added 
technology center, to avoid the adverse 
impact of the ever-increasing labor and 
other operational costs in China.
• The city has fully utilized its first mover 
advantage. It took advantage of the early 
investments brought into the country by 
Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs as a result 
of its Special Economic Zone status. This 
significantly boosted the city’s economy 
and its ability to attract talent. 
• Shenzhen may be a lesson to other 
economies. The central government made 
a concerted effort to create the success of 
Shenzhen. It is a classic example of sheer 
decision and resources that created value. 
The city started with almost nothing, as 
opposed to Shanghai, its main rival city, 
which had been highly developed already 
before the Second World War.
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